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McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia1 the Supreme
Court has attempted to clarify the requirements for death penalty
statutes in order to satisfy the mandates of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court
has both narrowed the spectrum of death-eligible defendants2 and
given approval to procedures designed to ensure consistency in cap-
ital sentencing.3
The severe nature of the death penalty has prompted the Court
to require a high degree of rationality and consistency in capital sen-
tencing.4 This pattern ofjurisprudence is consistent with the evolv-
ing standards of decency in contemporary society. In McCleskey v.
Kemp, 5 however, the Court drifted away from this goal by holding
that Georgia's capital sentencing system was constitutional despite
evidence that it had applied the death penalty in a racially discrimi-
natory manner. 6
This Note examines the application of Georgia's capital sen-
tencing system by analyzing the facts, lower decisions, and Supreme
Court opinions in McCleskey v. Kemp. In reviewing the errors in the
majority's opinion, this Note argues that the Court misinterpreted
prior decisions with regard to capital punishment. This Note also
argues that the Court inappropriately relied on various policies to
justify its reasoning. Finally, this Note concludes that the Court un-
1 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(holding that all of the discretionary death penalty statutes
then in effect violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments," which was made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
2 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
3 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
4 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
5 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
6 Id. at 1765.
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dermined important state concerns in maintaining the death
penalty.
II. FACTS OF MCCLESKEY V.KEMP
A young black male, Warren McCleskey, "was convicted of two
counts of armed robbery and one count of murder in the Superior
Court of Fulton County, Georgia, on October 12, 1978." 7 The evi-
dence at trial showed that McCleskey and three accomplices
planned and completed the robbery of a furniture store.8 During
the robbery, a white police officer, responding to a silent alarm, en-
tered the store.9 As the police officer was walking down the center
aisle of the store, he was struck and killed by two shots.10
Several weeks after the robbery, McCleskey was arrested for an
unrelated offense."' After his arrest, McCleskey confessed to the
furniture store robbery, but he denied the shooting of the police
officer. At trial for the events connected with the robbery, the State
introduced evidence that at least one of the bullets that struck the
officer was fired from a gun that matched the description of a gun
McCleskey had carried during the robbery. 12 Furthermore, wit-
nesses testified that they had heard McCleskey admit to the shoot-
ing.' 3 A petit jury convicted McCleskey of murder.'4
At the penalty hearing,' 5 the court instructed that the "jury
could not consider imposing the death penalty unless it found be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the murder was accompanied by one
of the statuatory aggravating circumstances," which are circum-
stances which add to the enormity or injurious consequences of the
crime.' 6 The jury found two aggravating circumstances, 17 and Mc-
7 Id. at 1761-62.






14 The relevant Georgia statute provides that a person commits murder "when he
unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of
another human being." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(a) (1984).
15 Georgia law provides that when ajury convicts a defendant of murder, "the court
shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury." GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-2(c) (1982).
16 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1762. A jury cannot sentence a defendant to death for
murder unless it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the following aggravating
circumstances existed:
(1) The offense ... was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction
for a capital felony;
(2) The offense... was committed while the offender was engaged in the commis-
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Cleskey offered no mitigating evidence. 18 The jury recommended
that McCleskey be sentenced to death for the murder conviction and
to two consecutive life sentences for the armed robbery convic-
tions.19 The trial courtjudge accepted the jury's capital punishment
recommendation and imposed the death penalty. 20
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the murder
and armed robbery convictions and the sentences. 21 After the
United States Supreme Court denied McCleskey's petition for a writ
of certiorari,22 the Superior Court of Fulton County denied McCles-
key's motion for a new trial. 23 Subsequently, the Superior Court of
Butts County denied McCleskey's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.24 The Supreme Court of Georgia denied McCleskey's ap-
plication for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the Butts
County Superior Court's denial of his petition. The United States
sion of another capital felony or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson
in the first degree;
(3) The offender, by his act of murder ... knowingly created a risk of death to
more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which
would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense ... for himself or another, for purpose of
receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of ajudicial officer, formerjudicial officer, district attorney or so-
licitor, or former district attorney or solicitor was committed during or because of
the exercise of his official duties;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind,
or an aggravated battery to the victim;
(8) The offense . . . was committed against any peace officer, corrections em-
ployee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties;
(9) The offense ... was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the
lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement; or
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or
another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (1982).
17 The two aggravating circumstances the jury found are discussed in GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 17-10-30(b)(2) and 17-10-30(b)(8) (1982). See supra note 16.
18 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
19 Id.
20 Id. The Georgia Code provides that "[w]here a statutory aggravating circum-
stance is found and a recommendation of death is made, the court shall sentence the
defendant to death." GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1982).
21 McCleskey v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146 (1980).
22 McCleskey v. Georgia, 449 U.S. 891 (1980).
23 McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
24 McCleskey v. Zant, No. 4909 (Ga. Super. April 8, 1981)(order denying petition for
writ of habeas corpus). Presumably, McCleskey was being jailed in Butts County, al-
lowing him to seek his writ of habeas corpus in Butts County.
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Supreme Court again denied certiorari. 25
McCleskey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 26
McCleskey's petition included a claim that "the Georgia capital sen-
tencing process ... [had been] administered in a racially discrimina-
tory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution." 27 In support of his claim, Mc-
Cleskey presented statistical research, namely, the Baldus study,28
"that purport[ed] to show a disparity in the imposition of the death
penalty in Georgia based on [both] the race of the murder victim,
and to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant." 29
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to consider
McCleskey's petition. Although it found no merit in McCleskey's
eighth amendment claim, 30 it carefully analyzed the Baldus study.
The court held that the Baldus study failed to contribute anything of
value to McCleskey's claims and dismissed his petition.3'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
sitting en banc, heard McCleskey's appeal of the district court's de-
cision.3 2 The Eleventh Circuit assumed the validity of the Baldus
study and addressed the substantive issues presented by McCles-
key's eighth and fourteenth amendment claims.33 The appeals court
believed the proffered statistics to be "insufficient to demonstrate
discriminatory intent or unconstitutional discrimination in the Four-
teenth Amendment context, [and] insufficient to show irrationality,
arbitrariness and capriciousness under any kind of Eighth Amend-
ment analysis."'34 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of McCleskey's claims despite confirming the validity of
the Baldus study.3 5 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to consider whether McCleskey's capital sentence was uncon-
stitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 36
25 McCleskey v. Zant, 454 U.S. 1093 (1981).
26 McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
27 Id.
28 Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74J. GRIM. L. & C. 661 (1983) [hereinafter Baldus].
29 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
30 See Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979) (holding that Florida's death penalty statute did not violate defendant's con-
stitutional rights).
31 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
32 McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985).
33 Id. at 895.
34 Id. at 891.
35 Id.
36 McCleskey v. Kemp, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A sharply divided Court3 7 affirmed the decision of the Eleventh
Circuit and held that the administration of Georgia's capital punish-
ment system did not violate the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.A8 Justice Powell began his opinion by setting the boundaries
of McCleskey's fourteenth amendment claim in which he asserted
"race ha[d] infected the administration of Georgia's statute in two
ways: persons who murder whites are more likely to be sentenced to
death than persons who murder blacks, and black murderers are
more likely to be sentenced to death than white murderers."3 9 Jus-
tice Powell noted that McCleskey's claim of discrimination extended
throughout the Georgia capital sentencing process-from jury to
prosecutor to the state legislature that had enacted the statute.40
Justice Powell then stated that the Court would join the string of
lower courts which had considered this issue41 and denied McCles-
key relief.4 2
Justice Powell began his analysis with the proposition that a de-
fendant who alleges an equal protection violation has a two-fold
burden. First, he must prove "the existence of purposeful discrimi-
nation,"' 43 and second, he must prove that the purposeful discrimi-
nation "had a discriminatory effect" on him.44 Justice Powell noted
that McCleskey relied solely on the Baldus study to compel an infer-
ence that his sentence rested on purposeful discrimination. 45 The
majority concluded that if the Baldus study was "sufficient proof of
discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular case, such
a claim would extend to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where
37 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion and was joined by ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Brennan filed a dissent which
Justice Marshall joined. Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined all but Part I of Justice
Brennan's dissent. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissent whichJustices Marshall and
Stevens joined and, in all but Part IV-B of which, Justice Brennan joined. Justice Ste-
vens filed a separate dissent and was joined by Justice Blackmun.
38 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1765-66.
39 Id. at 1766.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984);
Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443 (11 th Cir. 1983)(per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1063 (1984); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 976 (1979).
42 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1766.
43 Id. (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
44 Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
45 Id. at 1766-67.
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the victim was white and the defendant was black." 46
Justice Powell then discussed the Court's use of statistics to
demonstrate proof of intent to discriminate in limited contexts.4 7
Justice Powell observed that the two areas in which statistical evi-
dence had been used to prove an equal protection violation were in
the selection of thejury venire and in the showing of statutory viola-
tions under Title VII.4 8 Justice Powell asserted that the capital sen-
tencing decision and the relationship of statistics to that decision
were fundamentally different from the corresponding elements in
the venire-selection 49 or Title VII cases. 50 He reasoned that "[i]n
[venire-selection and Title VII] cases, the statistics related to fewer
entities, and fewer variables were relevant to the challenged deci-
sions" than in a capital sentencing case. 51 The majority noted that
each capital punishment decision was made "by a petit jury selected
from a properly constituted venire." 52 Justice Powell stated further
that each jury is unique in composition and that the Constitution
mandated each jury to rest its decision on several factors that vary
with each individual defendant and case. "Thus, the application of
an inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision
in a trial ... [would not] be comparable to the application of an
inference drawn from general statistics to a specific venire-selection
or Title VII case."53
Justice Powell discussed another difference between a capital
punishment case and the venire-selection and Title VII cases. In the
two latter contexts, Justice Powell reasoned that the factfinders have
a chance to justify the statistical disparity because these decision-
makers can be questioned about their motivation in decision-mak-
ing.54 In McCleskey, however, Justice Powell determined that the
state had no similar opportunity, because jurors cannot be called
" 'to testify to the motives and influences that led to their ver-
dict.' 55 Justice Powell also asserted that similar policy considera-
tions prevented an inquisition into a prosecutor's decision to seek
the death penalty.56 The majority stated that absent strong proof to
46 Id. at 1767.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
50 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
51 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1768.
52 Id. at 1767.
53 Id. at 1767-68.
54 Id. at 1768.




the contrary, "it [was] unnecessary to seek such a rebuttal, because a
legitimate and unchallenged explanation for the decision was appar-
ent from the record: [the defendant] committed an act for which the
United States Constitution and Georgia law permit imposition of
the death penalty." 57
Justice Powell next declared that McCleskey's statistical evi-
dence challenged decisions at the core of Georgia's criminal justice
system.58 He asserted that implementation of these laws required
crucial discretionary judgments and that exceptionally clear evi-
dence would be demanded to show that discretion had been
abused. 59 The majority stated that the "unique nature of the deci-
sions at issue in this case counsel[ed] against adopting such an infer-
ence from the disparities indicated by the Baldus study."' 60 The
majority thus held that the Baldus study was inadequate to compel
an inference that racial prejudice affected the sentence imposed
against McCleskey. 61
Justice Powell then considered McCleskey's contention that the
state as a whole violated the equal protection clause by adopting the
capital punishment statute despite its alleged discriminatory appli-
cation. 62 The Court dismissed this argument, asserting that "[f]or
this claim to prevail, McCleskey would have to prove that the Geor-
gia legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute be-
cause of an anticipated racially discrimanatory effect." '63 Justice
Powell stated that the Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia64 demon-
strated that the Georgia capital sentencing system could operate in a
fair and neutral manner, especially in the absence of any evidence
"that the Georgia legislature enacted the capital punishment statute
to further a racially discriminatory purpose. ' 65 Justice Powell fur-
ther reasoned that "McCleskey [had not] demonstrated that the leg-
islature maintained its capital punishment statute because of the
racially disproportionate impact."' 66 The Court refused to infer a
discriminatory purpose from the statute because of its determina-
tion that the legislature had legitimate reasons to adopt and main-






63 Id. (emphasis in original).
64 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
65 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1769-70.
66 Id. at 1770.
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tain capital punishment. 67
The Court next addressed the petitioner's claim that Georgia's
capital sentencing system was cruel and unusual punishment pro-
hibited by the eighth amendment. Justice Powell began by analyz-
ing the precedents which set restrictions on capital punishment. 68
The majority also acknowledged the constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment. 69 The Court then discussed how the death penalty must
be based on contemporary standards of decency70 indicated by two
sources: decisions of state legislatures 7 1 and decisions of juries. 72
The Court was guided by Furman v. Georgia73 and Gregg v. Geor-
gia74 in its eighth amendment analysis of Georgia's death penalty
statute. In Furman, the statute at issue provided no basis "for deter-
mining in any particular case whether the death penalty imposed
was proportionate to the crime."' 75 Gregg addressed the issue left
open in Furman-whether the death penalty for murder was violative
of the eighth and fourteenth amendments under all circumstances. 76
The Gregg Court noted the long history of acceptance of the death
penalty in both the United States and England.77 In the aftermath
of Furman, thirty-five states re-enacted the death penalty.78 The
Court in Gregg concluded that the decision of a jury to institute the
death penalty was consistent with the intent of the Georgia
legislature.79
The Gregg Court upheld the constitutionality of particular pro-
67 Id.
68 Id. The Court's early eighth amendment cases examined the methods of execu-
tion to determine "'whether they were too cruel to pass constitutional muster.'" Id.
(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170). See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890)(electrocu-
tion); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879)(public shooting). The Court has also ac-
knowledged that "punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the
offense." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
69 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
70 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1771.
71 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
72 Id. See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)(felony murder); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)(rape).
73 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
74 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
75 Furman, 408 U.S. at 313.
76 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168.
77 Id. at 179.
78 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1771. Thirty-seven states now have capital punishment
statutes that have been enacted since the Court decided Furman. Id. at n.23 (citing
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (Oct. 1, 1986)).
Federal law authorizes capital punishment in cases of aircraft piracy if a death results.
Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i)(1)(b) (1974).
79 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.
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cedures embodied in the Georgia punishment statute.80 The major-
ity explained that Furman required that in a situation in which
discretion is given to a sentencing body considering the death pen-
alty, that discretion must be limited to minimize the risk of "arbi-
trary and capricious action."8' The new Georgia capital punishment
system met the concerns raised in Furman with the following safe-
guards: the bifurcation of guilt and sentencing proceedings, 2 the
narrowing of the class of murders subject to the death penalty, 3
allowing the defendant to introduce any relevant mitigating evi-
dence,8 4 and the requirement of an inquiry into the circumstances of
the offense along with the propensities of the particular offender.8 5
Thus, Justice Powell reasoned in McCleskey that although discretion
still existed in the Georgia capital sentencing system, this discretion
was effectively limited by objective criteria that avoided
descriminatory application.8 6 The majority asserted that the sys-
tem's provision for an automatic appeal of a death sentence to the
Georgia Supreme Court, aided by a detailed questionnaire,8 7 added
protection for a defendant because a determination was made as to
whether the sentence was imposed under prejudice.88 Furthermore,
the Court concluded that the appeals process also required ade-
quate evidence of whether statutory aggravating circumstances ex-
isted and whether the sentence was disproportionate to sentences
imposed in similar murder cases.8 9
The Court observed that further restrictions on capital sentenc-
ing decisions had been imposed in cases since Gregg.90 These cases
required the invalidation of a mandatory sentencing system,9' the
"narrow[ing of] the class of murderers subject to capital punish-
ment," 92 and the provision of specific guidelines to the sentencer.93
Justice Powell also noted that sentencers were required to consider





84 Id. at 189.
85 Id.
86 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1772.
87 Id. The trial judge answers a questionnaire about the trial, including questions as





91 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
92 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.




Justice Powell then discussed Godfrey v. Georgia,95 in which the
Court evaluated the application of Georgia's capital sentencing stat-
ute in particular cases. 96 According to Justice Powell, the Court in
Godfrey held that Georgia's interpretation of the statute had "vitiated
the role of the aggravating circumstance in guiding the jury's sen-
tencing discretion." 97
Justice Powell described how objective community standards
had demonstrated a consensus that the death penalty was dispro-
portionately applied to certain classes of cases. 98 He also summa-
rized the constitutional spectrum of discretion a jury has in
imposing the death penalty. 99 First, a required threshold of rational
criteria must be found before the death penalty may be imposed.100
Second, states cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any rel-
evant mitigating factor.'10 Justice Powell then asserted that McCles-
key's argument was not one of disproportionality in the traditional
sense and that his sentence was proportionate to the crime of
murder.102
Justice Powell rejected the contention that McCleskey's case dif-
fered from other cases in which defendants had received the death
penalty.' 0 3 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court had found that
the sentence in McCleskey's case was not disproportionate to other
cases of capital punishment in Georgia.' 0 4 The majority agreed with
this analysis. When sentencing discretion has been adequately con-
trolled, Justice White argued in Pulley v. Harris, such a proportional-
ity review was not even required.10 5
Justice Powell reasoned that McCleskey could not prove a viola-
tion of the eighth amendment by showing that similar defendants
94 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1773 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 588, 604 (1978)(plu-
rality opinion)).
95 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
96 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1773.
97 Id.
98 Id. See also Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
99 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1774.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984)). McCleskey did "not deny that he
committed a murder in the course of a planned robbery, a crime for which the Court has
determined that the death penalty constitutionally may be imposed." Id. (citing Gregg,
428 U.S. at 187). McCleskey's argument was that his sentence was disproportionate to
sentences in other murder cases. Id.
103 Id.
104 McCleskey v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E. 2d 146 (1980).
105 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984).
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did not receive the death penalty. 10 6 The majority stated that no
precedent suggested that providing an individual defendant leni-
ency is violative of the Constitution. 10 7 Justice Powell argued that
because McCleskey's sentence was given within Georgia sentencing
procedures that channel discretion with consideration of the indi-
vidual circumstances of the crime and the defendant, the Court
could presume McCleskey's sentence was not imposed "wantonly
and freakishly" 108  and therefore violative of the eighth
amendment. 109
Justice Powell then addressed McCleskey's challenge "that the
Georgia capital punishment system . . . [was] arbitrary and capri-
cious in application, and [was] therefore . . . excessive, because ra-
cial considerations may influence capital sentencing decisions in
Georgia." 11 0 First, Justice Powell examined the possible interpreta-
tions of the Baldus study.111 The majority observed that Professor
Baldus did not contend that his study proved race entered into all
capital sentencing decisions, but only that there existed some likeli-
hood that the race factor entered into some capital sentencing deci-
sions. 112 Justice Powell acknowledged a risk that racial prejudice
could influence a jury's decison along with other forms of preju-
dice.1 13 He believed the proper question was whether this risk was
so great that it was constitutionally impermissible.1 14 Although Mc-
Cleskey argued that the Baldus study demonstrated the requisite
likelihood of racial prejudice, the majority declined to follow this
view. 115
Justice Powell asserted that the Court, in recognizing the risk
that racial considerations may enter the criminal justice process, has
made continuous efforts to remove racial prejudice from the crimi-
nal justice system. 116 Justice Powell stated that the right to trial by
jury was both a cornerstone of the whole criminal justice system 117
and was one of the fundamental protections against racial preju-
dice.' 18 More specifically, the Court argued that a capital sentenc-
106 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1774.
107 Id.
108 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.












ing jury had the ability to give an impartial expression of the
community's beliefs on the ultimate question-the death penalty. 19
Justice Powell next noted that each individual juror contributed
a wide variety of experiences to the jury's collective deliberations,
some of which were impossible to ascertain.' 20 Thus, he observed
that some jury decisions were difficult to explain. 121 Justice Powell
argued that this inherent lack of predictability did not warrant de-
struction of the system.' 22 Rather, he reasoned that "the jury's
function was to make . . . the uniquely human judgments that...
[add] 'equity and flexibility to our criminal justice system.'"123
Justice Powell reasoned that McCleskey's argument that the
Constitution condemned the discretionary characteristics of the
Georgia capital sentencing system was "antithetical to the funda-
mental role of discretion in our criminal justice system."' 124 Justice
Powell asserted that discretion gave the criminal defendant substan-
tial benefits, including not returning a conviction or imposing a
lesser sentence.' 25 The majority further stated that although deci-
sions against a defendant's interest are reversible, "discretionary ex-
ercises of leniency are final and unreviewable."' 126 He then noted
similar benefits that were derived from prosecutorial discretion. 127
Justice Powell stated that a capital punishment system that did not
allow for discretionary acts of leniency would be untenable.' 28
Justice Powell believed that "at most the Baldus study indi-
cat[ed] a discrepancy... correlat[ing] with race."'129 Justice Powell
reasoned that although seeming disparities were an inevitable part
of our criminal justice system, the discrepancy indicated by the
Baldus study was not similar to the major systemic defects noted in
Furman.'30 Justice Powell next asserted that there existed no perfect
procedure for deciding in which cases the death penalty should be
imposed.' 3 ' Justice Powell reasserted that even with these imper-
fections, if the process has been adequately insulated with safe-
guards to ensure fairness, the discretionary elements would not be
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1777.
122 Id.







10 Id. at 1777-78.
13' Id. at 1778.
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removed simply because some results were unexplained. 32 Justice
Powell stated that when considered along with the safeguards that
exist to reduce racial prejudice in the process, the fundamental
value of a jury trial, and the benefits of discretion to the criminal
defendant, the Baldus study had not shown "a constitutionally sig-
nificant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital-sentencing
process."133
Justice Powell concluded his opinion by addressing two final
concerns. First, he reasoned that McCleskey's claim would throw
"principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system" into se-
rious question.' 34 Justice Powell feared that if McCleskey's claim-
"that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing de-
cision"-was honored, similar claims would be asserted concerning
other types of punishment. 135 Furthermore, Justice Powell posited
that McCleskey's claim could be extended to other claims based on
other unexplained discrepancies, such as membership in other racial
groups or gender.136 The majority contended that statistical dispar-
ities that correlate with race or sex could be applied to a variety of
actors in the criminal justice system. 137 Justice Powell stated that
"[t]he Constitution [did] not require that a State eliminate any de-
monstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant fac-
tor in order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital
punishment." 13 8
Second, Justice Powell believed that McCleskey's arguments
were more appropriate for legislative consideration. 139 He stated
that it was neither the duty nor the right of the Court to determine
the appropriate punishments for crimes. 140 The majority observed
that legislatures are better suited to analyze the usefulness of statis-
tical studies in terms of their particular localities.' 4 1 Justice Powell
explained that "the duty of the courts was to determine, on a case-
by-case basis, whether the laws were applied consistently with the
Constitution."' 142 Justice Powell agreed with the district court and
the court of appeals that in this case the law of Georgia was properly
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1779.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1780.
137 Id.








B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENT
Justice Brennan began by reasserting his opinion "that the
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 144 Justice
Brennan then stated that even if he did not hold that position, Mc-
Cleskey had demonstrated the irrationality in capital sentencing that
has long been condemned in the Court's eighth amendment juris-
prudence. 145 Justice Brennan contended that the majority's reason-
ing for discounting the evidence presented in the Baldus study
could not justify ignoring the force of the study.14 6
Justice Brennan first emphasized his belief that the Court's as-
sertion that the defendant could not prove the influence of racial
prejudice on the sentencing decision in his case or in any other indi-
vidual case was not probative in considering the eighth amendment
claim which he raised. 147 Justice Brennan believed the proper con-
cern was with the risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence,
rather than with proof of an arbitrary sentence in a specific case. 148
Justice Brennan stated that "this emphasis on risk acknowledge[d]
the difficulty of... determining the jury's motivation in a... [partic-
ular] case. ... [while it also showed] that [the] concern for arbitrari-
ness focuses on the rationality of the system as a whole."' 49 Justice
Brennan next analyzed how risk had been the relevant consideration
in cases in which death sentences were struck down as a result of
ambiguous definitions of heinous crimes or in which mandatory
death sentences were imposed. 150 Justice Brennan reasoned that
the Court has required a defendant to establish that the system
under which a sentence was rendered posed a significant risk that
impermissable considerations infected the process.' 5 ' Justice Bren-
nan noted that McCleskey presented, for the first time, empirical evi-
dence, rather than mere speculation, to show that the system
143 Id.
144 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); See supra note 37 for alignment ofjustices.
145 Id. at 1782 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 1783 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).




actually operated in an unconstitutional manner.1 52
Justice Brennan next provided a detailed analysis of the Baldus
study. 15 3 He followed this analysis with a discussion of the forceful-
ness and accuracy of the multiple-regression analysis, especially the
one used in the Baldus study.' 54 Justice Brennan then stated that in
determining what risk would be acceptable, courts must take into
consideration the complete finality of the death sentence.' 55 Justice
Brennan reasoned that because courts will not convict a defendant
"if the chance of error is simply less likely than not," courts "should
not be willing to take a person's life if the chance that his death
sentence was irrationally imposed is more likely than not."'1 56 Justice
Brennan concluded that racially prejudiced sentencing, because it is
irrational, should be condemned in eighth amendment
jurisprudence. 15 7
Justice Brennan proposed that the Baldus study must be con-
sidered in conjunction with the history of the racially biased criminal
justice process in Georgia.' 58 Justice Brennan noted that since colo-
nial times, the criminal law in Georgia differentiated between whites
and blacks. 159 Justice Brennan then observed that the Court "had
152 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1976); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
153 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1784 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 1785-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Brennan, the Court
in Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986), held that:
a multiple-regression analysis need not include every conceivable variable to estab-
lish a party's case, as long as it includes those variables that account for the major
factors that are likely to influence decisions. In [McCleskey], Professor Baldus in fact
conducted additional regression analyses in response to criticisms and suggestions
by the District Court, all of which ... confirmed the study's original conclusions.
McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1785 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1786 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The Baldus study indi-
cated that, after taking into consideration 230 nonracial factors that could legitimately
influence a sentencer, the jury more likely than not would have spared McCleskey's life
had his victim been black." Id. at 1784 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The study separates:
(1) cases in which the jury exercises virtually no discretion because the strength or
weakness of the aggravating factors usually suggests that only one outcome is ap-
propriate; and (2) cases reflecting an "intermediate" level of aggravation, in which
the jury has considerable discretion in choosing a sentence. McCleskey's case falls
into the intermediate range; in such cases, death is imposed in 34% of the white
victim... [cases] and in 14%o of the black victim... [cases], a difference of 139% in
the rate of imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 1786 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 1786 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
157 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For many years, the criminal law in Georgia "ex-
pressly differentiated between crimes committed by and against blacks and whites, dis-
tinctions whose lineage traced back to the time of slavery. During the colonial period,
black slaves who killed whites in Georgia, regardless of whether in self-defense or in
defense of another, were automatically executed." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing A.
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invalidated portions of the Georgia capital sentencing system 3
times over the past 15 years."160 Justice Brennan observed that at
least one justice in each of these decisions discussed the spectre of
racial prejudice.' 6 ' Justice Brennan next explained that his histori-
cal view was not meant to force the state to make amends "for past
trangressions.... but that it would be unrealistic to ignore the influ-
ence of history in assessing the implications of McCleskey's evi-
dence.' 62  Justice Brennan found that the majority's
acknowledgement of continued efforts to eradicate racial prejudice
did not show the elimination of the problem, but, rather, its
persistence.' 63
Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he discretion prosecutors and
jurors in the Georgia capital-sentencing system created opportuni-
ties" for racial prejudice to infect the system.' 64 Justice Brennan
noted that no guidelines existed in Georgia governing
"prosecutorial decisions to seek the death penalty," nor were jurors
provided with a "list of aggravating or mitigating factors" or with
instructions as to how to apply them. 165 Thus, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that "[t]he Georgia capital sentencing system... provide[d]
considerable opportunity for racial considerations, however subtle
and unconscious, to influence charging and sentencing
decisions."166
Justice Brennan next asserted that the majority misinterpreted
existing eighth amendment precedents. 167 He stated that McCles-
key's evidence was an exercise in "moral judgment, not a mechani-
cal statistical analysis."' 6 8 Justice Brennan reiterated that the death
penalty required a high degree of rationality due to its irrevocable
nature. 169 The dissent reasoned that "[a] capital sentencing system
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 256
(1978)).
160 Id. at 1787 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 1788 (Brennan,J., dissenting). See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
163 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1787 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The cases reflect a variety
of situations in which racial considerations influence criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986)(peremptory challenges); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254 (1986)(selection of the grand jury); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985)(in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967) (selection of the petit jury).
164 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1788 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 1789 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in which race more likely than not play[ed] a role" did not meet the
constitutional standard of rationality. 170
Justice Brennan next analyzed the four reasons cited by the ma-
jority for not accepting McCleskey's evidence: "the desirability of
discretion .... the existence of statutory safeguards against abuse of
that discretion, the potential consequences for broader challenges
to criminal sentencing, and an understanding of the contours of the
judicial role." 171 Justice Brennan stated that although these con-
cerns required careful deliberation, "they do not justify rejecting ev-
idence as convincing as McCleskey . . presented." 172
Justice Brennan asserted that reliance on race is antithetical to
the very reasons for granting sentencing discretion. 173 "Discretion
is a means, not an ends." Thus, a "[f]ailure to conduct ... an indi-
vidualized ... inquiry 'treats all ... [defendants] not as unique indi-
vidualized human beings, but as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
death penalty.' "174 Justice Brennan asserted that "decisions influ-
enced by race rest, in part, on a categorical assessment of the worth
of human beings according to color" that disregards the individual
qualities of the defendant. 175 He posited that an increased willing-
ness to impose the death sentence on black defendants or a dimin-
ished willingness to impose the death penalty in crimes in which
blacks are victims reflected a devaluation of the lives of blacks. 176
Justice Brennan next reasoned that if a higher risk that race plays a
role is required before action is taken, the goals of discretion will be
undermined. 177
Justice Brennan acknowledged that a presumption existed "that
actors in the criminal justice system exercise their discretion in re-
sponsible fashion, [so courts] do not automatically infer that sen-
tencing patterns that do not comport with ideal rationality [are
improper]."' 178 Justice Brennan asserted that such a presumption,
however, is rebuttable. 179 He concluded that the majority had im-
170 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 1789-90 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 1790 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
304 (1976)).
175 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that discretion is granted to
treat each defendant as an individual. This goal is undermined when defendants are
treated as indistinguishable members of a class of criminals.
178 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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posed a crippling burden of proof on defendants in order to rebut
this presumption and present the need for individualized sentencing
decisions. Justice Brennan stated that the majority had rejected the
most sophisticated capital sentencing analysis ever done and one
which demonstrated that race was a likely factor in sentencing deci-
sions. 180 Thus, Justice Brennan reasoned that a rebuttable pre-
sumption had been turned into a conclusive one.18 1
Justice Brennan next considered the Court's assertion that Mc-
Cleskey's evidence was insufficient in light of the safeguards
designed to reduce bias in the system which was upheld in Gregg.18 2
Although the Gregg Court did not grant permanent approval to the
Georgia sentencing system, it assumed that the safeguards were ad-
equate in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 183 Justice Bren-
nan asserted that the empirical nature of the Baldus study prevented
the Court from relying on the statutory safeguards to reject McCles-
key's evidence. 184 Justice Brennan posited that the Baldus study
showed that the effectiveness of these safeguards cited by the major-
ity was the very subject at issue.1 85
Justice Brennan next attacked the majority's fear that accept-
ance of McCleskey's evidence would lead to widespread challenges
throughout the criminal justice 'system.' 86 He proposed that the
prospect that more widespread sentencing abuse in the criminal jus-
tice system than McCleskey had shown may have occurred was dis-
couraging but that it did not justify complete abandonment of the
Court's judicial role. 187 Justice Brennan acknowledged that any hu-
manly administrated penalty system would exhibit some imperfec-
tion, but the Court, in rejecting McCleskey's evidence, failed to
consider the qualitatively different nature of the death penalty, the
repugnance of racial discrimination, and the unprecedented acuity
180 Id. at 1790-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712
(1986). In Batson, the Court showed that the presumption that peremptory challenges
were exercised in a neutral manner was rebuttable.
182 McCleskay, 107 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan relied on
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226 (1976), in which "the Court rejected a facial chal-
lenge to the Georgia capital sentencing statute, describing such a challenge as based
'simply an assertion of lack of faith' that the system could operate in a fair manner."
McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 226
(White, J., concurring)).
183 MCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and strength of the Baldus study.' 88
Justice Brennan reiterated the qualitative difference between
the death penalty and other forms of punishment. 8 9 He analyzed
the different interests of the state and the defendant in the death
penalty context, stating that "[t]he marginal benefits accruing to the
state from obtaining the death penalty rather than life imprisonment
are considerably less than the marginal difference to the defendant
between death and life in prison."' 190 As a result of this unique pun-
ishment, Justice Brennan reasoned that "the degree of arbitrariness
that may be adequate to render the death penalty 'cruel and unu-
sual' punishment may not be adequate to invalidate lesser penal-
ties."'' l Thus, Justice Brennan determined that the majority's fear
of the complete destruction of our legal system was without a sound
base. 192
Justice Brennan next addressed the majority's fear that the ac-
ceptance of McCleskey's claim would render all sentencing invalid
"because... a correlation might be demonstrated between sentenc-
ing outcomes and other personal characteristics."' 193 Justice Bren-
nan believed that such a worry was inconsequential to a
determination of whether punishment was "cruel and unusual."' 194
Justice Brennan stated that "we have expressed a moral commit-
ment" that race would not be a basis for distributing burdens and
benefits. 95 Thus, Justice Brennan was disturbed by the possibility
that the "decison to impose the death penalty could be influenced
by race.., and evidence that race may play even a modest role in...
[the imposition of] a death sentence should be enough to character-
ize that sentence as 'cruel and unusual.' "196
Justice Brennan next stated that an irrelevant factor, such as
hair color, at least theoretically, could be associated with sentencing
results, but the evaluation of such evidence must be informed by
both history and experience. 197 Justice Brennan rejected the
Court's fear of the expansive ramifications based upon a holding in
favor of McCleskey because of the outstanding quality of the Baldus
study, an action which he believed would establish a "stringent stan-
188 Id. at 1792 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
197 Id. at 1792-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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dard for statistical evidence." 198 Justice Brennan concluded that de-
spite the Court's acceptance of the validity of McCleskey's evidence,
it was willing to let the death sentence stand because of a baseless
fear that the Court could not successfully establish standards for
lesser crimes. 199
Justice Brennan finally considered the majority's worry that the
Court was usurping the legislatures' role in constructing and con-
trolling capital punishment.20 0 After acknowledging the importance
of a sparing use of constitutional intervention, 20 ' Justice Brennan
stated that capital punishment is the most powerful act a state can
perform and, therefore, deserves close scrutiny. 20 2 Justice Brennan
posited that this objective must be upheld even when considering
those individuals "society finds most . . .opprobrious. ' 20 3 Justice
Brennan asserted that the courts' duty was to protect such individu-
als in order to prevent the majoritarian view from trampling over
constitutional protections and to fulfill the goal of the effective sepa-
ration of powers.20 4
Justice Brennan concluded his dissent in McCleskey by discussing
the historical efforts of the Court to eradicate racial prejudice from
society.20 5 He declared that the rejection of McCleskey's evidence
sent a disturbing message to a society that had formally repudiated
racism. 2 0 6
C. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENT
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent to address McCles-
key's fourteenth amendment claim.20 7 Justice Blackmun first re-
marked "that racial discrimination is fundamentally at odds with our
constitutional guarantee of equal protection." 20 8 Justice Blackmun
next noted that the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment
revealed that discriminatory enforcement of a state's criminal laws
was a matter of concern for the drafters of the amendment. 20 9
198 Id. at 1793 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 1794 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Stone, The Common Law in the United States,
50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (1936).
205 McClkskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1794. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 1794-95 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 37.
208 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1795 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Justice Blackmun also emphasized the qualitatively different na-
ture of the death penalty and other forms of punishment.2 10 He
was disturbed that instead of applying a more stringent standard for
scrutiny of capital punishment, the Court had applied "a lesser stan-
dard of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."2 11
Justice Blackmun believed the majority's assertion-that be-
cause McCleskey was convicted of murder, his fourteenth amend-
ment claim was weakened-was inconsistent with the Court's
precedents. 212 Justice Blackmun noted that the invalidation of a
criminal conviction on constitutional grounds does not necessarily
preclude retrial and resentencing by the state.2 13 Thus, Justice
Blackmun argued that invalidation would be applicable with the per
se reversal rule in cases involving racial discrimination. 214 There-
fore, a conviction does not suggest that discrimination did not im-
permissibly enter the capital sentencing process.2 15
Justice Blackmun proposed that the majority's "reliance on le-
gitimate interests underlying the Georgia legislature's enactment of
its capital punishment statute was inappropriate."2 1 6 He stated that
such considerations were relevant if the case involved a facial chal-
lenge to a statute but were irrelevant in a consideration of how the
statute had been applied.21 7
Justice Blackmun stated that "[i]n analyzing an equal protection
claim, a court must first determine the nature of the claim and the
responsibilities of the state actors involved to determine what show-
ing is required for the establishment of a prima facie case."218 He
asserted that "[t]he Court treat[ed] the case as if it [were] limited to
challenges to the actions of two specific decision-making bodies-
the petit jury and the state legislature," a restriction which allowed
the Court to distinguish McCleskey's case from other cases in which
statistical evidence provided a framework for review.2 19 Justice
Blackmun contended that McCleskey's case did fit into this frame-
work. He also focused on the decisions that were made by the pros-
210 Id. at 1796 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
211 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
212 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1978);
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1967).
213 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1796 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 1796-97 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 1797 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
218 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ecutor, who is the primary actor in a state criminal proceeding.220
Justice Blackmun stated that this post-conviction decision-making
period was a juncture in the proceeding in which the evidence of
racial factors was especially strong.2 2 1 Justice Blackmun noted that
"a criminal defendant alleging an equal protection violation must
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination." 222 Justice Black-
mun believed that once a defendant established a prima facie case,
the burden shifted to the prosecution to rebut that case.2 23
Justice Blackmun next argued that McCleskey met the three-
prong test for establishing a prima facie case set out in Casteneda v.
Partida:224 the defendant must show that he was a member of a dis-
tinct group singled out for differential treatment; he must show "a
substantial degree of differential treatment"; and he must show that
"the allegedly discriminatory procedure is susceptible to abuse or is
not racially neutral. '225
Justice Blackmun asserted that McCleskey easily met the re-
quirements of the first prong of the test because "[t]he Baldus study
demonstrated that black persons are a distinct group that are sin-
gled out for differential treatment in the Georgia capital sentencing
system. ' 226 Justice Blackmun noted not only that cases involving a
white victim, regardless of the race of the offender, lead to more
death penalties, but also that black defendants were more likely than
white defendants to receive the death penalty.2 27
Under the second prong of the test, Justice Blackmun ad-
dressed the question of when the risk of race-based differential
treatment becomes constitutionally unacceptable. 228 Justice Black-
mun emphasized that the Baldus study showed systematic dispari-
ties in the infliction of the death penalty based on the race of the
victim and the defendant, even after allowing for the presence of
other factors that may affect capital punishment decisions.2 29 Jus-
220 Id. at 1798 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun refers to evidence indicating pros-
ecutors disproportionately seek the penalty phase for black defendants. Transcript of
Federal Habeas Corpus Hearing 894-926.
222 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1798 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
223 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1798 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
224 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). This test was also discussed in Batson v. Kentucky, 106
S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
225 MCieskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1798-99 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 1799 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
227 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 1799-800 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). McCleskey established that because he
was charged with killing a white person, he was 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to
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tice Blackmun declared that:
[t]he most persuasive evidence of the constitutionally significant effect
of racial factors in the Georgia capital-sentencing system was McCles-
key's proof that the race of the victim was more important in explain-
ing the imposition of a death sentence than the factor of whether the
defendant was a "prime mover" in the homicide.230
Similarly, the race-of-the-victim factor is nearly as crucial as the stat-
utory aggravating circumstance, whether the defendant had a prior
record of a conviction for a capital crime.231
Justice Blackmun next examined the evidence in McCleskey's
case, focusing on the prosecutor's decision to seek the death pen-
alty. He argued "that McCleskey established that the race of the
victim is an especially significant factor at the point where the de-
fendant has been convicted of murder. ... 232 At this point in the
process, "the prosecutor must choose whether to proceed to the
penalty phase of the trial and create the possibility that a death sen-
tence may be imposed or to accept the imposition of a sentence of
life imprisonment." 233 Justice Blackmun found the evidence
presented by the defendant to be statistically significant to show that
racial factors had an adverse effect.2 34
Justice Blackmun posited that McCleskey had fulfilled the third
and final prong of the Casteneda test by showing the susceptibility to
abuse of the process by which the state decided both to seek a death
penalty in his case and pursue that sentence throughout the prose-
cution.235 Justice Blackmun observed that the assistant district at-
torneys were given no guidelines as to how to proceed at any
particular stage of the prosecution.236 Justice Blackmun also ob-
served the absence of guidelines to suggest when to "seek an indict-
ment for murder as opposed to a lesser charges," when to accept a
plea bargain, and when to seek the death penalty.23 7 Justice Black-
mun stressed that all of these decisions were left to the complete
death as he would have been had he been charged with killing a black person. Id. at
1800 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Baldus, supra note 28, at 707-09.
230 Id. at 1800 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
231 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
233 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The state-wide statistics indicated that black de-
fendant/white victim cases advanced to the penalty trial at nearly five times the rate of
the black defendant/black victim cases (70% v. 15%), and over three times the rate of
white defendant/black victim cases (70% v. 19%)." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
Baldus, supra note 28, at 707-09.
234 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1801 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
237 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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discretion of the assistant district attorneys, who, in turn, informed
the district attorney of their decisions.238
Justice Blackmun declared that this evidence demonstrated that
at every stage the assistant district attorney exercised a great deal of
discretion. 239 He observed that the sole effort to obtain consistency
in the decision to seek the death penalty consisted of the district
attorney's periodic pulling of files to check on the progress of
cases. 240 The assistant district attorneys were not required to report
why they decided whether to seek the death penalty. 241 Justice
Blackmun discussed several factors that the district attorney thought
relevant to the decision to seek the death penalty242 and also noted
that the death penalty was not sought in every case in which statu-
tory aggravating circumstances existed.243 Justice Blackmun ob-
served that the district attorney testified "that his office still
operated in the same manner as it did when he took office in 1964,
except that it... [no longer] sought the death penalty in... rape
cases."
244
Justice Blackmun reasserted the effect of the history of racial
discrimination in Georgia. 245 The evidence from the Baldus study,
considered in conjunction with the evidence presented by Justice
Brennan, was sufficient to show "an inference of discriminatory pur-
pose. ' 246 Thus, without evidence to the contrary, Justice Blackmun
presumed that racial factors entered into the decisionmaking pro-
cess, and the burden, therefore, shifted to the state to show that
racially neutral criteria and procedures yielded the seemingly ra-
cially influenced result.247
Justice Blackmun considered the state's proposition "that if the
Baldus thesis was correct then the aggravation level in black-victim
cases where a life sentence was imposed would be higher than in
white-victim cases."'2 48 Justice Blackmun disputed this theory be-
cause "[t]he State did not test its hypothesis to determine if white-
238 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
240 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
241 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 1802 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The factors listed by the district attorney
included the strength of the evidence, the atrociousness of the crime, and the likelihood
that a jury would impose the death sentence.
243 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See Goker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding
that the death penalty was unconstitutonal for the crime of rape).
245 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See id. at 1787-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 1802 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
247 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
248 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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victim and black-victim cases at the same level of aggravating circus-
tances were similarly treated"-a test McCleskey's experts per-
formed.249 Justice Blackmun argued that McCleskey's experts
"demonstrated that the racial disparities in the [capital punishment]
system were not the result of differences in the average aggravation
levels between white-victim and black-victim cases."' 250 In sum, Jus-
tice Blackmun stressed that McCleskey had demonstrated an acute
trend of differential treatment due to race.251
Justice Blackmun also disputed the majority's reasoning for not
applying this analysis to McCleskey.252 He disagreed with the Court's
analysis on the differences between this case and the venire-selec-
tion or Title VII cases. 253 Justice Blackmun agreed with the major-
ity that it would be difficult to examine the juries' decision-making
process because such an examination would create "an inherent
tension between the discretion accorded capital-sentencing juries
and the guidance for use of that discretion that is constitutionally
required." 254 Justice Blackmun examined Imbler v. Pachtman,255 in
which the Court refused to require that the prosecutor provide an
explanation for his actions in initiating and pursuing a criminal
prosecution.256 However, he stated that Imbler did not stand for the
proposition that prosecutors could not be called upon to answer for
their actions. 257 Justice Blackmun asserted that although prosecu-
tors undoubtedly need adequate discretion to perform their duties,
their decisions are not beyond the constraints imposed on state ac-
tion under the fourteenth amendment. 258
Justice Blackmun also discussed the Court's view that this case
was distinguishable from Batston v. Kentucky. 259 He believed McCles-
key satisfied even the standard of Swain v. Alabama 260 "a standard
that was described in Batson as having placed on defendants a 'crip-
249 Id. at 1802-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 1803 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
251 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
252 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 1803-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
254 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
255 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
256 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
257 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
258 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
259 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting); see Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1720 (1986)
(reaffirming that a prosecutor's actions are not unreviewable).
260 380 U.S. 202 (1965)(holding that a black defendant could make out a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system as a
whole was being abused).
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pling burden of proof.' "261
Justice Blackmun considered the Court's proposition that Mc-
Cleskey's case could lead to other constitutional challenges.26 2 He
found this an insufficient reason to deny McCleskey his rights under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 63 Justice
Blackmun asserted that if this case did, in fact, lead to closer scru-
tiny of the entire system, then society as a whole could possibly
benefit.2 64
Justice Blackmun concluded his opinion by agreeing with Jus-
tice Stevens that the acceptance of McCleskey's claim would not
eliminate capital punishment in Georgia.2 65 Justice Blackmun sug-
gested that the establishment of guidelines for prosecutors as to an
appropriate basis for exercising their discretion would provide a
measure of consistency in the process.2 66
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens also asserted the qualitatively different nature of
the death penalty and the necessity that its use be based on reason,
rather than caprice or emotion.2 67 He agreed that the Baldus study
indicated that the racial considerations were working at a constitu-
tionally intolerable level.2 68
Justice Stevens stated the Court's fear that the acceptance of
McCleskey's claim would remove the death penalty in Georgia was
incorrect.2 69 If a choice had to be made between a discriminatory
death penalty and no death penalty at all, the choice would be
clear.2 70 Justice Stevens declared that the Baldus study exposed a
category of extremely serious crimes, such as crimes involving mul-
tiple aggravating circumstances, in which the death penalty was im-
posed without regard to the race of the victim or race of the
offender.2 71 He believed that restructuring the system to reduce the
class of death-eligible defendants would significantly lessen the
261 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Batson, 106 S. Ct.
at 1720).
262 Id. at 1805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
266 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 1805-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 37.
268 Id. at 1806 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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chance of a discriminatory imposition of the death penalty.272 Jus-
tice Stevens concluded his dissent by stating "that further proceed-
ings [would be] necessary in order to determine whether
McCleskey's sentence should be set aside. '273
IV. ANALYSIS
During the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has struggled
with the task of determining constitutional requirements for the im-
position of the ultimate sanction in our criminal justice system-the
death penalty. After recognizing the arbitrary character of various
death penalty statutes, 274 the Court has attempted to reduce the
quantity of death-eligible defendants275 and has established stan-
dards to control the discretionary aspects of capital sentencing by
removing the possibility of arbitrary and capricious application.276
Unfortunately, these capital punishment limitations have not proven
to be as effective in practice as in theory.
In McCleskey, the Court was presented with unparalleled statisti-
cal evidence that the death penalty in Georgia was being applied in a
racially influenced manner.277 Yet, the Court turned its back on this
evidence and on the history of racial bias in Georgia. Instead, it
found that the Georgia capital punishment system was operating in
a constitutional manner. In doing so, the Court placed a crippling
burden of proof upon defendants that counters the Court's own ju-
risprudence.278 Instead of giving direction to the state legislatures
on how to more effectively filter the discretionary aspects of capital
sentencing, the Court has not only further entrenched a process that
is constitutionally impermissible, but has also defeated some of the
major purposes behind states' continued support of the death
penalty.
A. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE BALDUS STUDY
The quality of the Baldus study hinges upon its multiple regres-
272 Id. (Stevens. J., dissenting).
273 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
275 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding death penalty unconstitutional
for crime of rape); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding automatic
death penalty unconstitutional).
276 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that Georgia's definition of
aggravating circumstances were too vague to comply with constitutional requirements);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that Georgia's sentencing system met
constitutional requirements).
277 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
278 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1720 (1986).
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sion analysis. A multiple regression analysis is a procedure that
makes precise and quantitative estimates of the effects of different
factors on some variable of interest.279 A researcher first identifies
the major variables, such as race, that are believed to influence the
dependent variable, here, the rate of death sentencing.280 The con-
nection between the dependent variables and the independent vari-
able of interest is then estimated by removing the effects of the
other major variables. 28 ' When this analysis is completed, a precise
estimate of the effects of the variables can be made.28 2
Within this general framework, Professor Baldus and his team
of researchers performed an exhaustive multiple regression analy-
sis. The study's data sample examined over 2000 murder cases" that
occurred in Georgia during the 1970s. 2 3 Professor Baldus ana-
lyzed "230 variables that could have explained the disparities on
nonracial grounds." 28 4 Thus, the results of such a study are very
likely to be an accurate indicator of the effect of race on capital
sentencing.
The results of the Baldus study can be described as nothing less
than alarming.28 5 The most disturbing fact revealed by the study is
that "defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as
likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing
blacks." 28 6 Perhaps even more striking, the Baldus study showed
that prosecutors seek the death penalty for 70% of the black defend-
ants who are convicted of killing white victims, and only 19% of the
white defendants who are convicted of killing black victims. 287
These statistical facts make Justice Powell's inability to find a consti-
tutional violation even more disconcerting.
Justice Powell dispensed with the pattern of racial discrimina-
tion indicated by the Baldus study with the following reasoning:
279 Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 702, 704 (1980).
There are other minor influences which combine to form a non-negligible effect; these
influences are placed in what is called a random disturbance term. It is then assumed
that the joint effect of the minor influences is not systematically related to the effects of
the major influences being investigated; effects of the influences are treated as being due
to chance. Multiple regression thus provides a means not only for extracting the system-
atic effects from the data sample but also for assessing how well one has succeeded in
the presence of the remaining random effects. Id. at 705-06.
280 Id. at 705-06.
281 Id. at 706.
282 Id.
283 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
284 Id. at 1764.
285 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
286 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1764.
287 Id. at 1785 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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"Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of the
criminal justice system. The discrepancy indicated by the Baldus
study is 'a far cry from the major systemic defects identified in
Furman.' "288 Such reasoning is deficient in two respects. First, it
ignores prior jurisprudence, in which statistics were used to show
patterns from which the Court inferred a constitutional violation.
Second, it misses the proper focus of eighth amendment jurispru-
dence in this context, namely, the risk of arbitrariness in the applica-
tion of punishment.
The majority opinion used the Baldus study in a curious man-
ner. Although the Court assumed the validity of the study, it disre-
garded the very results the study yielded. 289 The fact that the
validity of the study was assumed is not curious because the Baldus
study is the most accurate and comprehensive statistical analysis of
capital punishment ever completed. Thus, the "discrepancy that ap-
pears to correlate with race" 290 should not have been so easily
passed over by the Court.
Statistics from a multiple regression analysis indicate patterns
in the aggregate of a data sample. Thus, the Baldus study cannot
prove, with absolute certainty, the intent of an individual to discrim-
inate. This problem is compounded by the discretionary aspects of
the capital sentencing process. Nevertheless, the Court has previ-
ously accepted statistics to establish constitutional violations in
other forms, specifically, in the selection of the jury venire291 and to
prove a Title VII violation.292 In both instances, a common sense
analysis prevailed and a stark discriminatory pattern was recognized.
In a case in which both contemporary and historical evidence ex-
isted, the Court held the statistics sufficient to imply discriminatory
intent. 293 No direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such as direct
testimony, was provided by the statistics in Arlington Heights and
Bazemore. A similar situation existed in McCleskey: a strong statistical
pattern existed, but direct testimony was absent from the record.
Justice Powell's attempt to distinguish McCleskey from the jury
venire selection and Title VII cases is unconvincing.29 4 Justice Pow-
ell stated that these other cases "relate to fewer entities, and fewer
288 Id. at 1777 (footnote omitted)(quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)).
289 Justice Powell stated that the assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid
did not include the assumption that the study shows that racial considerations actually
entered into any sentencing decisions in Georgia. Id. at 1775.
290 Id. at 1777.
291 Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
292 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
293 Id. See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268-7 1.
294 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1767-68.
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variables are relevant to the challenged decisions." 295 The exhaus-
tive quality of the Baldus study eliminates this worry. Professor
Baldus took so many variables into account that the pattern of dis-
crimination his study indicates is, in reality, even more oppressive.
With an effective regresssion analysis, the fact that more variables
exist does not automatically render the study any less accurate.
Justice Powell argued that in McCleskey the state had no oppor-
tunity to explain the statistical disparity, while in the jury venire and
Tide VII cases, such an opportunity existed.296 True enough, pro-
cedural safeguards are necessary to protect the integrity of jurors
and other decisionmakers in the capital sentencing process.2 97 Yet,
such procedural safeguards should not be used to remove the con-
stitutional rights of a more significant actor in the system: the de-
fendant. A defendant, such as McCleskey, should not have to suffer
the penalty of death because of other functional infirmities in the
criminal justice system.
Justice Powell's analysis seems generally counterintuitive. The
majority employs stricter standards to show discrimination in the
capital punishment system than to show discrimination in jury ve-
nire or Title VII cases. It must be reiterated that death is a graver
punishment, so superior safeguards are necessary to insure an even-
handed application of the death penalty. Justice Powell, however,
dismissed evidence which indicated that this goal was not being
satisfied.2 98
B. THE RISK OF ARBrTRARINESS AND THE LEGACY OF FURMAN
A second major error injustice Powell's reasoning is that it fails
to recognize the proper focus of the Court's eighth amendment ju-
risprudence. The eighth amendment requires an examination of
the risk that a death penalty was arbitrarily and capriciously im-
posed.299 Justice Brennan's eloquent dissent accurately maps out
how the Court, since Furman, has consistently focused on the risk
that a death sentence was arbitrarily imposed.30 0 "[T]hat the death
penalty 'may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that cre-
ate a substantial risk that punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner' "1 is a succinct and completely accurate
295 Id. at 1768.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 1777-78. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
299 Id. at 1783 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
300 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
301 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427).
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statement of what precedent requires the focus to be in analyzing
the McCleskey evidence. This method of analysis has been consist-
ently affirmed.30 2 Thus,Justice Powell's insistence that the evidence
should prove the invalidity of individual sentences is inappropriate
and establishes a virtually impossible burden of proof for the
defendant.
The only way to get better results than those provided by the
Baldus study would be to ask the discretionary actors within the cap-
ital sentencing infrastructure whether they had discriminated in a
particular case. Unfortunately, the possibility of getting this infor-
mation is highly improbable. First, such an admission would be ex-
tremely unlikely, even if the actor knew he had consciously
discriminated. Second, subconscious discrimination would defi-
nitely not be discovered, because by definition the actor would be
unaware of his discriminatory tendencies. Third, such an admission
would be precluded because the discretionary actors cannot be
asked about these influences. Attempts to show discrimination
through testimony are effectively foreclosed, and empirical evidence
is effectively disregarded. Thus, defendants are precluded from as-
serting any viable claim that an arbitrary sentence has been handed
out.
Upon closer inspection, it appears that Justice Powell is aware
that the risk of racial discrimination is a crucial factor in eighth
amendment analysis. Justice Powell acknowledged the risk of racial
prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a criminal case.30 3 He
quoted from Turner v. Murray :304 "the question is at what point that
risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable. ' 30 5 Such an acknowl-
edgement is surprising considering Justice Powell's focus on indi-
vidual sentencing. Thus, Justice Powell does not question the
empirical results of the Baldus study, yet, because they are unsatis-
factory to establish a constitutional violation, the Court has effec-
tively established an insurmountable burden of proof.
Furman and its progeny presented a pattern which should have
302 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) ("constitutionally im-
permissable to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has
been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death rests elsewhere"); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976)
(mandatory death sentences held invalid for same reasons expressed in Woodson); Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
303 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1775.
304 90 L. Ed. 27, 37 (1986)(holding that a "defendant accused of an interacial crime is
entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the victim's race and questioned on the
issue of racial bias").
305 Id. at 45.
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been followed by the Court, but unfortunately was not. In 1971, the
Court in McGautha v. California reviewed the procedures used by the
states to administer their death penalty statutes and gave those stat-
utes constitutional approval.30 6 Only one year later, Furman struck
down these statutes,30 7 finding that they were unconstitutional in
their application.3 08 Furman thus reaffirmed a critical principle:
statutes, although neutral and fair on their face, must still demon-
strate, in practice, that fair and nonarbitrary death sentences are
handed down by the capital punishment systems in order for those
systems or sentences to be deemed constitutionally acceptable.30 9
Although a situation was presented in which the Court could
have applied the Furman standard, the McCleshey Court failed to fol-
low the Furman Court's lead. According to Justice Brennan, the
Gregg Court stamped the various states' death penalty statutes as be-
ing valid on their face.3 10 As noted by Justice Brennan, "Gregg be-
stowed no permanent approval on Georgia's capital punishment
system,"just approval in the absence of contrary evidence. 31' Once
again, the Court has been presented with evidence that a death pen-
alty statute is still constitutionally unacceptable in its application.
The Court, however, broke from the analogous situations of Mc-
Gautha and Furman and ruled that the Georgia statute is constitu-
tional in application. The Court finally had contrary evidence, but it
failed to employ that evidence although precedents warranted its
use. The reasons given for this break with precedents do not attack
the evidence presented by McCleskey. Instead, the Court simply of-
fered policy reasons for ignoring the results of the Baldus study.
This sort of analysis is inadequate to protect the rights of McCleskey
and other prisoners on death row in Georgia.
Justice Brennan noted the four policy reasons cited by the
Court for not yielding to "the implications of McCleskey's evidence:
the desirability of discretion for actors in the criminal justice system,
the existence of statutory safeguards against abuse of that discre-
tion, the potential consequences for broader challenges to criminal
sentencing, and an understanding of the contours of the judicial
306 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
307 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
308 Id.
309 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976)(the Texas capital sentencing system's requirement of a finding of statutory ag-
gravating circumstance was held valid for the same reasons expressed in Gregg); Proffit v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (a capital sentencing system where trial judges make sen-
tencing determinations was constitutional for the same reasons noted in Gregg).
310 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
311 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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role.131 2 These are, perhaps, sound policy reasons for establishing
the facial validity of a capital punishment statute. Yet, these reasons
are not strong enough to overcome the mandates of the Constitu-
tion under the eighth amendment. Justice Brennan correctly recog-
nized that the Baldus study calls these same safeguards into
question.
Justice Brennan gave a fine substantive analysis of why the
Court defeated the very policies it purported to promote. In gen-
eral, when presented with empirical results that some aspect of our
criminal justice system is discriminatory, the Court is required to
take whatever steps are necessary to eradicate this evil from the sys-
tem. Instead of addressing this task, the Court relied on conclusory
policy arguments which do not go to the substantive claim, namely,
that arbitrary capital sentencing exists at the expense of the rights of
defendants such as Warren McCleskey.
C. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Justice Blackmun's artful opinion demonstrated that the Geor-
gia capital sentencing also violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 313 Justice Blackmun accurately showed that
McCleskey has fulfilled the three-prong requirements of Batson v.
Kentucky3 14 and Castaneda v. Partida.315 The policy reasons selected
by the McCleskey Court are insufficient to ignore the evidence that an
equal protection violation has occurred. An individual should not
be deprived of his constitutional rights even though safeguards exist
to protect the integrity of the process, if, in fact, these safeguards
are ineffective. The Court's reasoning is contrary to the guarantees
of the Constitution and, therefore, is incongruent with the goals of
American society.
D. THE DEATH KNELL OF THE DEATH PENALTY?
As noted by Justice Stevens, the majority's decision appears in
part based on a fear that the acceptance of McCleskey's claim would
lead to the destruction of the death penalty in Georgia. 316 The
Baldus study shows that this worry is inappropriate. There exists a
group of crimes for which the death penalty is consistently imposed
without regard to the race of the victim or defendant.3 17 Defend-
312 Id at 1789-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
313 Id. at 1795 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
314 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
315 430 U.S. 582 (1977).
316 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1798-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
317 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ants who commit murders of an extremely heinous nature are con-
sistently given the death penalty. The Baldus study indicates that in
a sample which includes all defendants convicted of murder, death
sentences are rendered at a rate of over 50% in which more than
three statutory aggravating circumstances are present.3 18 A similar
result is shown by examining the rate at which cases proceed to a
penalty trial. In cases which three or more aggravating factors are
present, the cases advance to a penalty trial at a rate of at least
50%.3' m Of the cases that do advance to a penalty trial, namely
those cases in which four or more aggravating factors exist, death
sentences are handed down at a rate of at least 77%.320 If the hei-
nousness of the crime is measured by the aggravation level, these
patterns indicate that heinous murders lead to high death sentenc-
ing rates.
One method to alter the racially discriminatory patterns shown
by the Baldus study would be to limit death sentencing to those
cases in which multiple aggravating circumstances are present.
Such a plan could be implemented without removing the discretion-
ary aspects of death sentencing. Currently, all cases that involve
multiple aggravating circumstances do not result in the giving of
death sentences. This plan would limit the class of death-eligible
defendants to those that society has already shown they feel are
most opprobrious, regardless of the race of the defendant or the
victim.
This proposal still leaves the opportunity for racial discrimina-
tion to operate. Yet, the Baldus study shows that race is less of a
factor in high aggravation cases. The Court remarked in Singer v.
United States321 that constitutional guarantees are met when "the
mode [for determining guilt or punishment] itself has been sur-
rounded with safeguards to make it as fair as possible. ' '3 22 This plan
would guard against racial prejudice in the system because blacks
would stand a lesser chance of receiving differential treatment. To
eliminate the death penalty entirely would be inappropriate because
the states have shown they want the death penalty to exist.3 23 Still,
the statutes must satisfy constitutional requirements. Further limit-
ing of the class of death eligible defendants would satisfy the inter-
318 Baldus, supra note 28, at 700.
319 Id. at 706.
320 Id. at 707.
321 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965)("a defendant's only constitutional right concerning the
method of trial is to an impartial trial by jury").
322 Id. at 35.
323 See supra note 78.
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ests of the states while also going further to fulfill the requirements
of the Constitution.
E. MCCLESKEY'S NEGATIVE EFFECT ON DETERRENCE AND RETRIBUTION
Two goals often cited as reasons for the retention of capital
punishment are deterrence of future murders and retribution for
the ultimate wrong of taking another person's life.324 Both of these
justifications are subject to considerable debate. Empirical studies
have not determined with any degree of certainty whether the death
penalty deters more murders than does a lesser sentence. 325 Justice
Stewart summed up this view stating that:
[a]lthough some . . . studies suggest that the death penalty may not
function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there
is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this
view.... [W]e do not know, and for systematic and visible reasons
cannot know what the truth about this "deterrent" effect may be....
A "scientific"-that is to say, a soundly based-conclusion is simply
impossible, and no methodological path out [of] this tangle suggests
itself.3 26
The retribution goal also is the subject of much disagreement.
First, whether or not revenge should be considered in our punish-
ment system is an issue of much debate. 327 Second, whether retri-
bution goals can possibly be met due to the fact that the death
penalty is applied relatively infrequently is another point of
contention. 328
These two enumerated gray areas have important implications
when considered in tandem with the results of the Baldus study.
Since the deterrent and retributive effects of capital punishment are
unclear, particular care should be taken in its application. The
Baldus study indicates that this care has not been exercised to the
greatest extent possible.329 Even if one assumes that capital punish-
ment does have substantive deterrent effects, the Baldus study
shows that capital punishment will have a lesser deterrent effect on
certain prospective murderers, most significantly, white murderers
with black victims, because these criminals are the least likely to re-
324 For collections of opposing views on the deterrent effects of the death penalty,
compare D. BENDER AND B. LEONE, THE DEATH PENALTY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (1985);
B. NAKELL AND K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1987); T. SELLIN,
THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1980).
325 See T. SELLIN, supra note 324, at 35-53.
326 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976).
327 T. Sellin, supra note 324, at 35-53.
328 Id.
329 Baldus, supra note 28, at 728.
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ceive the death penalty. Finally, a similar result should be realized
for the retribution goal because black victims will not receive the
same rate of retribution for their lost lives as white victims. 330 Over-
all, the Baldus study indicates that the current capital sentencing
system in Georgia presents a devaluation of black lives that is
intolerable.
The uniqueness of the death penalty should require superior
rationality in its application; "the qualitative difference of death
from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater de-
gree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination." 33 1 This
view is strengthened by the uncertain effects of capital punishment.
It seems logical that a force with uncertain effects should be em-
ployed in as predictable a fashion as possible or else not used at all.
The Court's ruling in McCleskey, however, shies away from this ideal.
The Court's decision allows less rationality while at the same time
sanctioning a negative form of predictability at the expense of black
lives-both victims and defendants. These factors should lead to
tighter restrictions; unfortunately, the Court allows the perpetua-
tion of a system that is highly unpredictable.
The deterrent effects of the death penalty, assuming that they
exist, are also obviated. Georgia has demonstrated a very low death
sentencing rate in black victim cases. 332 The Baldus study shows the
rate is 6% in black victim cases compared with 24% in white victim
cases.33 3 The study also notes that this inequity is particularly prev-
alent when prosecutors are deciding whether to seek a death sen-
tence. Furthermore, the disparity persists after adjustment for the
aggravation level of different cases.334 Georgia juries and prosecu-
tors appear to tolerate greater levels of aggravation without impos-
ing the death penalty in black victim cases as compared with white
victim cases.3 35 Thus, the black community is not receiving the
same protection against murder that the white community is receiv-
ing. Equal protection of the laws is therefore unfulfilled. This fact
is particularly disturbing when one considers the proportion of
black victim murders in the entire Baldus study sample and the pro-
portion of blacks in the total population in Georgia.336 The black
community is overrepresented in the low income strata, making it
330 Id.
331 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)(footnote omitted).
332 Baldus, supra note 28, at 708-09.
333 Id. at 709.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 710.
336 Baldus, supra note 28, at 708-09.
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especially prone to the violence that often accompanies impoverish-
ment. It would seem that more deterrent factors should be concen-
trated on the black community, regardless of the race of the
defendant. However, the opposite result obtains. This devaluation
of black lives is at odds with the ideals of American society and
should be eliminated.
A similar argument can be made with regard to the retributive
effects of the death penalty. If the purpose of the death penalty is to
give society revenge for the ultimate wrong, the Baldus study indi-
cates that this goal is unsatisfied when blacks are murdered.3 37 If
retribution is a legitimate goal-an ideal to which the states seem to
adhere-then the uneven application of capital punishment yields
uneven retribution for those families whose lives are altered by the
loss of one of its members. The devaluation of black lives is again
the end result. With the existence of such a pattern, the equal pro-
tection mandated by the fourteenth amendment is a hollow aspira-
tion for black Americans.
F. DISCRIMINATION AND PROSECUTOR DISCRETION
Prosecutorial discretion is perhaps the most important discre-
tionary element in the Georgia capital sentencing system. The pros-
ecutor controls the type of conviction sought. The prosecutor also
controls the plea bargaining process and the dismissals of cases at
the postindictment-preconviction stage.33s Most significantly, the
prosecutor decides whether a trial proceeds to the penalty phase.339
This unbridled discretion provides ample opportunity for discrimi-
nation to operate.
Racial bias can infect the prosecutor's decisionmaking in two
possible ways. First, the prosecutor himself may be biased. This
could influence a prosecutor to attempt not only to vindicate the
lives of white victims more quickly than those of black victims, but
also to punish black defendants more severely than white defend-
ants. Second, a prosecutor may determine that juries discriminate
on a racial basis. In turn, this knowledge could affect the rate and
circumstances in which a prosecutor seeks the death penalty; the
prosecutor would seek the death penalty more often in white victim
and black defendant cases heard by a jury because of a greater
chance of success due to the biases of the jury. Either situation is
unacceptable under the rubric of the Constitution. Unless changes
337 Id. at 708-09.
338 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1801 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
339 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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are made, the system depicted by the Baldus study will retain discre-
tionary aspects that allow the influence of racial bias.
Changes could be easily implemented to lessen the chance of
prosecutor bias. Narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants is
one method.340 Another possible change would be to establish
guidelines for the actors in the district attorney's office to ensure
more consistency in the decision to seek the death penalty. Cur-
rently, no guidelines exist to channel the discretion wielded by pros-
ecutors.34 1 Such guidelines would not completely remove the
discretion demanded by prosecutors. However, they would provide
incentive for regular, thoughtful decisions which would make scru-
tiny easier. This change would not constitute a major inconven-
ience, and it would further the goal of making the system as fair as
possible by limiting the opportunities for abuse.
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROPER PARAMETERS OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE
The Court argues that McCleskey's arguments should best be
presented to the various state legislatures. 342 Justice Powell stated:
It is not the responsibility-or indeed even the right-of this Court to
determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes. It is the
legislatures, the elected representatives of the people, that are "consti-
tuted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the
people."... Legislatures also are better qualified to weigh and "eval-
uate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local condi-
tions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the
courts."
3 4 3
Justice Powell confused the issues and the evidence in this state-
ment. McCleskey's evidence did not suggest that capital punish-
ment was inappropriate for the crime of murder. McCleskey's
evidence instead was directed at whether punishment was being ad-
ministered fairly; the Baldus study indicates that fair administration
was not the practice in Georgia. The constitutional requirement of
the consistent and fair application of punishment was the heart of
the Furman decision. 344 The McCleskey Court abdicates its duty by
not adhering to the ideals set forth in Furman, resulting in the ig-
noring of the consequences of McCleskey's claims.
Furthermore, the Court has always taken an assertive role in
racial issues. The Court consistently has come to the rescue of ra-
340 See note 275 and accompanying text.
341 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 377, n.15 (1984).
342 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1781.
343 Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
344 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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cial minorities, who are often both politically and economically im-
poverished. 345 Presently, society has formally repudiated racism.
Yet, racial bias still exists, and it is the Court's duty to eradicate this
evil to the best of its ability. If recognizing McCleskey's evidence
challenges other aspects of our criminal justice system, so be it.
This is a challenge that is constitutionally mandated to protect all
Americans equally, irrespective of race. Racism is not something
that can be eliminated by one decision; it is too deeply rooted in our
society. Nevertheless, every small step in that direction contributes
to a larger good that benefits all of society.
ANDERSON E. BYNAM
345 Perhaps the most famous example is Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court struck down the segregation of public schools,
which at that time was a highly accepted practice.
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